Natural minds and divine truth: Rethinking the Augustinian1 idea of necessary truth by Oyelakin, RT




NATURAL MINDS AND DIVINE TRUTH: RETHINKING THE 
AUGUSTINIAN
1
 IDEA OF NECESSARY TRUTH 
 
Richard Taye Oyelakin 
Department of Philosophy,  
Obafemi Awolowo University,  




St Augustine of Hippo and the other fellow Augustinians, such as St 
Bonaventure, argued that the human mind lacks the cognitive capacity to 
attain the necessary, certain, and the immutable truth. This necessary, 
certain, and the immutable truth, they argued, can only come through 
divine illumination whose source is God. For this reason, many people 
have recourse to religious places in search of this immutable and 
necessary truth about nature and human beings. This paper argued that 
discourse about truths reduces to discourse about language truth. If it is 
true that language and meaning are natural and originate form human 
cognitive faculty, then statements about the idea of divine truth, divine 
illumination, necessity, and even every statement that purports to express 
or implies the existence of God, are all, as a matter of necessity, natural 
issues and are going to be product of man’s cognitive powers. No truth of 
these statements can therefore be beyond the natural. The paper then 
concluded that, seriously speaking, presumptuously what the 
Augustinians are looking for might be termed human idols which are 
invariably inherent in human cognitive faculty.     
 
Introduction 
St Augustine and the other proponents of his theory established 
that though man could be said to exist necessarily, that is, as thinking and 
doubting thing, everything about man is mutable and changeable. But, for 
Augustine, necessary truth could not be contained in the knowledge 
gained from the flux of experience. For this reason, human mind cannot 
attain the immutable, unchangeable, and necessary truth which underlines 
reality. Therefore, this immutable and necessary truth can only come 
from God through the medium of divine illumination. Hence, anybody in 
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search of the intelligible and unchangeable truth must be rightly 
positioned to have his mind divinely illuminated. In other words, 
certainty, reality and necessary truth can only come through divine 
illumination. 
 This question raised by Augustine and his proponents would lead 
us to a research into the origin of human language. It will make us ask a 
fundamental question that; is human language learned or given from 
above, natural or divine? In view of this question, we shall also examine 
the issue whether the meanings of our words and expressions are divinely 
fixed or human made. From the answers we get, we might be able to raise 
sufficient arguments to make our position. It is our hope that the 
consequences to the answers to these vital questions will give us a clue to 
the problem.     
 
St. Augustine of Hippo 
  Augustine could be classified among the early stage philosophers 
of medieval philosophy. His philosophy was immensely influenced by 
Platonic
2
 and Neo-Platonic as well as the Judeo-Christian principles. He 
discovered that Platonism and Christianity have much in common and he 
then harmonized his belief in God with his understanding of Platonic 
theory in order to find a solution to his quests. One of the major questions 
of his philosophy is about the nature of and the justification for what we 
hold to be our knowledge claims. Particularly, he was interested in 
finding out about the knowledge of the intelligible truth and reality. He 
chose to find explanation for his quest in Christian theology. In position 
of Plato’s form of the Good, Augustine substitutes God whose existence, 
he thought, is necessary. For him, since the existence of God is necessary, 
the whole of existence could be explained, using that necessary existence 
as a strong foundation. His division of the mode of acquiring knowledge 
into Sensation and Intellection is Platonic.  
The main difference is that intellect, for Augustine, does not 
contemplate the forms but participates in or is enlightened by the divine 
light. Sensation for him only provides changing, temporal and contingent 
knowledge. This kind of knowledge does not contain the self evident 
truth and certainty, the type he was searching for. The reason is that the 
self evident truth cannot contain in the changeable phenomena of 
sensation. In search of this immutable truth, Augustine resorted to the 
exploration of his inward part, using the intellect to search for the 
intelligible truth. His idea of exploration into the inward part of self 
through the intellect is Platonic
3
. The intellect therefore, is a certain 




power of the mind by which man can attain the unchanging judgment of 
the truth and certainty. This is because, “that the human mind can attain 
certainty was for him a fact beyond any reasonable doubt”
4
  
Augustine methodologically established the necessity of the 
existence of human beings against the argument of the skeptics. He 
argued that he could doubt all the knowledge from the senses he 
previously held as true. He doubted sensual knowledge because they 
could not give him the self evident truth and certainty. He then argued 
that if he doubts, there is something which remains evidently certain 
which cannot be doubted. That is the thing which doubts, seeks 
happiness, knows, thinks, etc. That which doubts and seeks must exist 




 It is worth mentioning here that, according to Augustine, 
doubting, knowing, etc of things is not identical with the mind. This is 
because he argues that human mind is also mutable, perhaps because the 
mind changes with the flux of experience. It will then follow that the 
thinking, doubting, and seeking thing is different from the mind. This 
argument may be seen as problematic in the sense that it might be 
difficult to conjecture of thinking, doubting, seeking thing apart from the 
mind, (not minding the controversy on the existence of the mind or the 
soul). If the thinking thing exists necessarily, that means it is not mutable, 
but the mind is mutable. That further means that mind does not exist 
necessarily. From the fore-going, it strongly follows that the thinking 
thing is radically different from the mind. But it must also be noted that 
all the activities of the thinking thing are identified with the mind. It is the 
mind that is believed to think, doubt, seek, etc. If this is so, it means that 
the mind is identical with the thinking thing. This argument raises an 
issue of whether the mind is different from the thinking thing. This might 
require an independent research work.  
Then two possibilities arise here. (1) It is either the mind exists 
necessarily as the thinking, doubting and seeking thing or (2) the thinking 
thing identified with the mind is also mutable and does not exist 
necessarily. Augustine may not favour any of the possibilities above. The 
third option which Augustine might be prepared to accept is to hold that 
the mind is radically different from that thinking thing. But, there seems 
to be a difficulty in justifying this position. This is because entities may 
be multiplied unnecessarily and we must always be conscious of the 
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Ockham’s razor. Nevertheless, the Augustinians may wish to provide a 
stronger proof for that position.  
However, the main concern of Augustine is “in our apprehension 
of necessary and immutable truths...”
6
. This is because “When I was in 
Italy, I often held converse with myself, as to the method by which truth 
is to be discovered. How I sighed for the truth, no one knows better than 
myself…”
7
 He was concerned about the immutability and the necessity of 
some propositions such as mathematical and geometrical propositions, the 
truths of which are neither created nor alterable by human minds. 
Propositions such as, 2+2=4, or the sum of the three angles of a triangle 
equals 180˚, are seen as immutable. These kinds of truths are discovered 
and regulate human mind and are therefore described as analytic. This is 
because they cannot be thought otherwise without getting into a 
contradiction. 
Having argued that human mind is mutable, some questions arise. 
These questions are: what is the implication of the independence of these 
truths as regard to human mind? How is it that the human mind, which is 
itself mutable and fallible, can attain certainty this way?
8
 To the first 
question, Augustine argues that the independence of these necessary and 
the immutable truths depends on the eternal ground and the foundation of 
all truths, which is God. In other words, what can be categorized as 
certain and immutable self evident truths lies in the divine realm. The 
answer to the second question follows. That is, the fallible and mutable 
mind is enabled to attain absolute certainty by means of what is referred 
to as ‘Divine Illumination’
9
.  
This divine power of illumination is identified with light which 
empowers the mind to apprehend the necessity and immutability in a 
certain judgment. Besides, the divine power of illumination also enables 
the mind to make judgments about things in their relation to the eternal 
ideas or standards. If the certain and necessary truth of the entire object 
and phenomenal in the physical world can only be known via divine 
illumination, then it becomes consistent that the knowledge of the truth, 
science and the empirical world has its explanation in the divine realm. It 
also follows that human mind can not know anything independent of the 
light of the divine illumination, “since no creature howsoever rational and 




If the knowledge of the necessary and intelligible truth based on 
the idea of divine illumination is predicated on the belief in the existence 
of God, then it becomes doubtful if the atheist could have access to such 




kind of truth and necessary knowledge. But this light is given to every 
man, irrespective of his spiritual and moral condition
11
. This means that 
everybody is necessarily lighted either one believes in God or not. But 
again Augustine gives conditions for participating in and attaining such 
necessary truth and certain knowledge. Such conditions include living 
piously, chastely and diligently including prayer and good life. This 
comes back to the issue. It becomes doubtful if the atheist could attain 
this kind of knowledge if one looks at it from Augustine’s point of view.  
If, however, the atheist could not attain this kind of knowledge, then it 
means that the theory is a relative one. But if God truly exists, his 
existence would not be a relative one and neither would he be contented 
with dealing with only those who fulfill the conditions above, since he is 
said to create all and he is not a God for a particular sect. Therefore, 
Augustine’s theory needs a reformulation here with a view to taking care 
of those who do not believe in the existence of God. This is because it 
cannot be argued that those who do not believe in God could not attain 
the knowledge of an immutable and necessary truth. But, from another 
point of view different from Augustine’s, it makes sense to argue that the 
atheist could fulfill those conditions. This is because it is possible to 
fulfill all the conditions above without believing in God. Whether 
Augustine would accept this position is another issue.  
Augustine’s aim is to find out what makes the intelligible truth 
possible. For him, an intelligible truth can neither be found in the 
changeable objects of nature nor in the mutable minds of man. Such truth 
is not the sort, which is found in the flux of nature; it is eternal and 
unchangeable.  He then argues that each natural object participates in the 
pure eternal truth. In other words, this eternal truth is the universal and 
each natural object copies from or participates in it. For him, it is 
impossible for the mutable minds of man to understand or correctly 
perceive the pure truth unaided; therefore, there must be a cause which 
enables human minds to simultaneously perceive the truth. “This cause is 
God”
12
. He compares the way God works to the way the sensible Sun 
makes corporeal things visible to the eye, “so God’s intelligible light 
renders the truths of science and wisdom manifest to the minds of men”
13
.  
Now, the influence of Plato and Neo-Platonism is clearly evident 
in the brief explanation of the work of Augustine. To make it clearer, 
Patrick Aspell wrote,  
Augustine appeared to be following Plato in using the 
Platonic approach to truth, namely, immutability a clear 
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sign of truth, and illumination as an account of the 
norm. He combined the Platonic idea of illumination 
with the Christian belief in the light which enlightens 




 This theory of ‘divine illumination’ forms the basis of all of 
Augustine’s epistemology, metaphysics and ethics. Through his theory of 
divine illumination, however, many other great thinkers such as St 
Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Don Scotus John 
were greatly influenced. The next section shall be based on 
Bonaventure’s attempt to use Augustinian position to argue against the 
Aristotelian philosophers. 
 
Giovanni Di Fidenza; St Bonaventure, ‘Philosopher of the Exemplar’ 
St. Bonaventure was introduced and immersed into the theory of 
Augustine by the duo of Alexandra of Hales and John of la Rochelle 
during his theological studies at the University of Paris. The influences of 
Plato, Neo-Platonism and Augustine are clearly evident in the philosophy 
of St Bonaventure. He started his theory by rejecting the Aristotelian 
theory, as interpreted by the Averroists and other lovers of Aristotle’s 
theory, that reason alone can be used to explain and justify all the 
existence and our knowledge of them. As Augustine, he also identifies 
two sources of knowledge; reason and faith. Reason, he argues, will only 
succeed in providing the explanation of all things in the world according 
to their nature alone. But his argument, pace Augustine, is that there is 
limit to what reason can understand and then explain, since reason is the 
object of the mind and the mind is mutable and fallible. Then, for 
Bonaventure, the knowledge which reason can provide will also be 
changeable, fallible and mutable. But, it is apparently clear that the kind 
of knowledge which they are searching for is not the mutable, changeable 
or fallible one
15
. Since this kind of knowledge cannot be achieved from 
reason, an off-shoot of the mind, then it follows that man has to look for 
the other source for that kind of knowledge they are seeking. This other 
source of knowledge is identified with the belief in the power of the 
divine. Then, his main task is to harmonize reason and faith, Philosophy 
and Theology.   
 It must be stated that St. Bonaventure was also a theologian with 
his firm belief in the existence of God, with all its attributes. He was 
opposed to the bottom-up explanation of phenomena in Aristotle’s theory. 
The bottom-up explanation is to the effect that the existence of the 




transcendence entity or divine being is derived from the understanding of 
the nature of empirical phenomenal in the natural world. Aristotelian 
cosmogony and cosmology are what could be termed this-worldly affairs. 
The origin and the organizational explanation of the world are 
concentrated on how human mind could understand and interpret the 
natural phenomena. What this presupposes is that the existence of God 
depends to a large extent on the reasonability and the knowledge of the 
natural objects. What follows from this argument is that, all that the mind 
could apprehend is the natural truths. Such truths would come from the 
knowledge of the individual objects of nature. The existence of any 
transcendental entity would then be a derivative from nature. 
This is a bottom-up explanation of the transcendence. If the 
explanation of the transcendence is bottom-up, then it means that such 
transcendental entity (for instance God), in a way, would be an invention 
of human reasoning. In other words, God, or any other metaphysical 
entities will then become the creative work of man and to know or 
understand God, all that would be done is to study the human reasoning 
ability. This would strictly lead to a purely anthropocentric position. This 
is what Plato, the Neo-Platonists and Augustine argue against in their 
theories. For them, the explanation and the knowledge of the world and 
intelligible truths are not bottom-up but up-down. This means that the 
explanation of the world and the nature of reality and self evident truths 
should be found in the understanding of the supreme metaphysical entity; 
in the case of Plato, it is the form of the Good, for Plotinus, ‘The One’ 
and, for Augustine and the rest theologians, that supreme entity is called 
‘God’. In fact, joining the theories of Plato and Augustine with his 
theology, Bonaventure argued that each individual changeable object in 
the world points to an unchangeable archetypal cause of all truth through 
which everything becomes intelligible
16
. This archetypal cause of all truth 
in Bonaventure’s sense is God. 
 
Duns Scotus 
 Duns Scotus, like other Aristotelian philosophers, was 
preoccupied with the attempt to respond to series of argument put forward 
by Augustine and the Augustinians in favour of the theory, ‘Divine 
Illumination’. Augustinians argued that human mind can not attain the 
intelligible truth without the influence of the divine illumination. Duns 
Scotus argued that “We can in fact attain certainty, and we can do so by 
the unaided exercise of our natural intellectual powers”
17
. In place of 
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Augustinian ‘Divine Illumination’, Scotus puts up the theory of 
‘Cognitive Intuition’. For him there are some cognitive truths which the 
mind can know intuitively and certainly without any divine aid. For 
instance, the inference from valid syllogistic argument, causal judgment 
about empirical phenomenal, and some certain propositions reporting our 
immediate acts and sense experience, are certainly known by the mind
18
.  
In a way to buttress this argument, scotus argues that since the 
intellect engages in reasoning that makes reference to the actual existence 
of particular sensible objects, it becomes certain that the mind must 
certainly know that the sensible objects exist without any divine power. I 
think this argument possesses some element of potency. This is because 
moving objects presupposes the existence of the concept ‘motion’. This 
may be argued to be intuitively known by the cognitive power of the 
mind without any divine power. It is also intuitively known by the 
cognitive power of the mind that the flux in the empirical objects in the 
empirical world presupposes the concept ‘change’.  
 
Rethinking the Augustinian Idea of Necessary Truth   
It may be objected that in the strict sense of it, what Bonaventure 
and other Augustinians are arguing is not that human mind can not attain 
some level of certainty. But the argument is that the kind of certainty that 
the mind can attain is a temporary and contingent one; one that may 
change any moment. But the type of certainty they are seeking is not a 
mutable or contingent one, but a necessarily immutable and unchangeable 
one. If the mind can attain any certainty at all as argued by Duns Scotus 
and the other Aristotelians, and they agree that the mind is itself mutable 
as well as the empirical world, then it becomes certain that such certainty 
is mutable. For, it is not clear how two mutable things, (the mind and the 
empirical world) can produce an immutable knowledge without any 
transcendental or divine influence.  
Since the mind is mutable, it is certainly liable to error. It is not 
therefore the case that the mind can not attain some level of certainty, but 
such is not a necessary, an immutable and unchangeable one. Then, it can 
not form a solid and strong base for the epistemic edifice. This is the 
reason for their argument for the need for an immutable, unchangeable 
and necessary entity which can serve as the strong foundation for the 
intelligible truth. Since God necessarily exists as an unchangeable and 
immutable entity, then such foundation must be sought in him. And since 
the mind can not attain this intelligible truth itself, then it needs some 
divine assistance. That is their argument for the divine illumination. 




Explanation of the Natural Origin of Human Language  
In order to get a way through into the problem raised by the 
Augustinians, there are some very pertinent questions that must be raised. 
For instance, are there divine truths, is/are there God or gods, and are 
there infallible, necessary, and unchangeable truths as claimed by the 
Augustinians, and/or are there truths which are mind independent that the 
mind only attains through the so called divine illumination? We must note 
that questions about truths will eventually reduce to questions about 
statements which express those truths. This, invariably, reduces questions 
of truths to questions language truths. This is because an unexpressed 
truth is not a philosophical issue. To avoid energy dissipation therefore, 
we shall approach these questions from a holistic point of view.  
Therefore we shall briefly research into the human language and then 
raise some fundamental questions. For example, it may be of interest to 
ask whether human language is natural or divine, learned or given from 
above. It may also be of interest to ask whether human intuitions, feelings 
and emotions are natural or divine. Answers to these fundamental 
questions, presumably, will pave a way for us to proceed on the problem. 
Answering these questions will show us the nature of divine truth, if there 
are, and also the nature of natural truths. 
For consistency’s sake, the Augustinians will have to hold the 
position that human language is divine and therefore given from above. 
Contrary to their position, however, there are some other theories about 
language learning, backed up with convincing evidences, to establish the 
point that human language is learned and therefore not divine. For 
instance, Noam Chomsky (the mentalists), argued that human language is 
learned. For him, human language is a mentalistic system comprising 
rules which are to be learned so that as new situation arises, these rules 
are applied. That explains why Chomsky identifies two levels in language 
learning. These levels are ‘competence’ and ‘performance’. The level of 
competence is the level of the ideal speaker-hearer who has a complete 
understanding of his language and is unaffected by such things as 
memory limitations, distractions, shift of attention, interest, and error in 
actual application of his language.
19
 At the level of competence, system 
of rules and the method of their application are learned. And at the level 
of performance, the learned system of rules is applied to concrete life 
situations. Therefore, at the level of performance, every speaker is 
expected to have mastered the rules that enable him speak his language, 
whether he is conscious of this or not. 
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To clarify this issue further, Chomsky writes; 
In the contrast, the discussion of language acquisition in 
preceding section was rationalistic in its assumption that 
various formal and substantive universals are intrinsic 
properties of the language – acquisition system, these 
providing a schemata that are applied to data and that 
determine in a highly restricted way the general form 
and in part, even the substantive features of the 
grammar that emerge upon presentation of appropriate 
data …
20
        
 
From this excerpt, it becomes clear, according to the mentalist, that 
human language is neither given from above nor is it divine, it is mentally 
and systematically learned. However, let not the reader be confused on 
what Chomsky said that; 
Thus the form of a language, the schemata for its 
grammar, is to a large extent given, though it will not be 
available for use without appropriate experience to set 




Readers may erroneously take Chomsky to mean that language is given 
from above here. This is not true. He is a mentalist and he is using this to 
establish the point that language learning is mentalistic in nature, even 
though the mental process sometimes uses the data from experience. 
 It is also important to briefly identify Quine’s theory of language 
learning. For Quine, language learning is empirical in nature. This is 
because we learn language by carefully understanding the impact of 
stimulation on our nerve endings. In other words, language is learned as a 
response to the corpus of verbal or non-verbal stimulation. The society 
also plays an important role in language learning, for Quine. For example, 
the society praises or rebukes the correct or wrong verbal response to the 
impinging stimulation respectively. So, for Quine, our language is largely 
formed from our disposition to assent or dissent to some direct or indirect 
stimulation. That is why Quine’s theory is called ‘stimulus–response 
theory of language learning’.  To explain this point further Quine writes 
that our language structure; 
Primarily as a whole, is multifariously linked to non-
verbal stimulation. These links attach to separate 
sentences (for each person), but the same sentences are 
so bound up in turn with one another and with further 




sentences that the non-verbal attachments themselves 




These are enough to show that human language is learned and not divine. 
Then, if language can be learned, it presupposes the possibility of being 
taught. Now, one most fundamental point of note in the theories identified 
is that language originates from man and hence it is highly dependent on 
human being. 
 On the question of our feelings, thoughts and emotions, there is no 
need to belabour the issue much; Augustine has already settled the issue. 
For him, human emotions, feelings, thoughts change with the flux of 
experience and therefore cannot attain the necessary truth. All that these 
mental stages can afford is mutable truth and knowledge. What this has 
certainly established is that all these mental stages are natural and not 
divine.  
 Now, having established that human language and mental stages 
are all natural, what are the consequences on the issue under discussion? 
The first thing to take note is that it means that any portion of our mental 
process; feeling, emotion, intuition, or thought expressed through human 
language is natural. Further from this, it follows that meaning is human 
dependent. In other words, since language originates from man, meanings 
of words and expressions are fixed by man. This is interestingly evident 
in the known fact that nothing in nature has its own name, names of 
things in nature are all man made. It then means that meanings are 
natural, strictly speaking. This explains the deep foundation of the 
conventionality of human language. What can we then bring out from all 
these in relation to the question of divine truth? Safely then, we can 
structure an argument out to make our point. 
P1: Discourse about truths eventually reduces to discourse about language 
truth    
P2: Language and meaning are man dependent hence natural 
P3: No word or expression has an independent meaning apart from the 
conventional one 
P4: Divine truth, necessary, infallible and unchangeable truth, etc, are all 
linguistic words and expressions 
Therefore, 5, the meanings of divine truth, necessary, infallible and 
unchangeable truth, etc, are man dependent and hence they are natural.   
From the argument above it becomes clear that our words and 
expressions are products of human cognitive faculty. It further means that 
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the meaning of the expressions in our language is man-made. There are 
some apparent consequences that can be drawn from this analysis. 
 
Consequences of Naturalization of Human Language 
 It follows that what we termed as divine truth, divine illumination, 
necessary truth, certainty, reality, etc, are all human inventions and they 
have whatever meaning that man confers on them. It then implies that 
there is no truth beyond man and at most no truth is beyond nature as far 
as that truth is about man’s mental processes or man language. It further 
means that the expressions, ‘there is divine illumination’, ‘God exists’, 
‘2+2=4’, ‘Water boils at 100
o 
C’, ‘God is the source of all truths’, etc, if 
they are truth, in whatever respect, are expressions of language or natural 
truth. In a clear term, it may be said that it is human being that actually 
gives existence to these truths. 
 It must also be borne in mind that as much as man is physical, 
man is also mental. We feel, think and reason, this power of rationality 
distinguishes man from other animals. From this rationality comes the 
natural power to arrange things as much as our rationality can stretch. 
Presumably, it may be noted that this cognitive ability in man has an 
infinitely stretching nature. Whenever man is able to apply this natural 
ingenuity to produce something new and better, they credit such invention 
to some supernatural forces, instead of recognizing the natural ingenuity 
or power. Even, such statements used to invoke the supernatural powers 
are themselves, by the same token of argument natural. This rational 
power of thought, when it is put to a qualitative use, produces some 
qualitatively systemized form of our expression. Some of these 
expressions, we say they are necessary or certain or the two together. So, 
from the fore-going, it is apparently clear that it is human being in their 
natural power that decides which expression or statement or term, 
judgment or truth is a priori and which is contingent, which is necessary, 
which is divine, which is unchangeable, which is certain, and so on. This 
is a departure from the Aristotelians who claimed that there are some 
things that the human mind is capable of knowing. This is, in a way, 
arguing that human linguistic ingenuity is the whole idea. This argument 
is not atheistic as it may be construed. Of course, it does not ban the wood 
carvers from doing their jobs and neither does it detract the priests from 
making idols out of the carved woods. But if we are consistent, the 
conclusion is necessary. 
 Let it not be objected that the whole analysis is extolling 
anthropomorphism. This is because such objection will be self stultifying. 




That means if such objection is true, then its truth will only have 
depended on the natural arguments in this paper. From the arguments in 
this paper therefore, it then becomes clear that human being themselves 
are the creator of the idols
23
 they worship their linguistic ingenuity which 
they have made so sacrosanct. But is there any better option? Well, this is 
not a call to disengage from such enterprise as that of the Augustinian but 
it must be borne in mind that what we claim that we are looking for is our 
handiwork.  
 Lastly, I must state here that the scope of this work is not to enter 
deeply into the causes and nature of religious beliefs. Ayer, as it were, has 
summarized the thesis. For him, “We are concerned only to answer those 
questions which arise out of our discussion of the possibility of religious 
knowledge. The point which we wish to establish is that there cannot be 
any transcendent truths of religion”
24
. This is because consistent with the 
arguments in this paper; all truths are human language dependent.    
 
Conclusion 
The paper has shown how Augustine combines Platonic and the 
Neo-Platonic ideas together in his philosophical quest to know the origin 
of the intelligible truth. We argue that Augustine’s position is that human 
mind, being mutable and fallible, is bereft of the ability of the knowledge 
of necessary, immutable, unchangeable or self evident truth and reality 
unless they are illumined by God. In passing, I tried to argue that this 
argument may exclude the atheist from having such knowledge.  
In order to understand the nature of the problem, I researched into 
the origin of human language and discovered through some notable 
theories that language is man made. As language is human invention, it 
also implies that meaning of our words and expressions are also human 
made and hence natural. It then means that human beings, through their 
language, are the creators of the divine truth and all other idols which are 
subsequently made sacrosanct. It then follows that most of what human 
beings seriously engage themselves in searching are what they created 
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